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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
Louis Michael Seidman'
Mark Tushnet has been my friend and mentor for over thirty-five
years. For a substantial part of that time, to its permanent discredit,
much of the legal academy remained ignorant of or, worse, dismissive of
his prodigious accomplishments. I admire Tushnet for many reasons,
but one of them is because of his persistence and integrity during the
long years when many legal academics refused to take him seriously. I
have written previously about the ways in which his personal and
professional commitments have served as a model for me.' On this
occasion, rather than repeating what I have already said, I think that the
most appropriate way to honor his achievements is by giving a portion of
his work the kind of sustained and serious attention that it should have
received in the past.
The question that I have asked in the title of this Essay is also a
kind of tribute to Tushnet. One of the reasons legal academics did not
take Tushnet seriously in the early part of his career was because of his
uncompromising commitment to leftism. Although he has not
abandoned that commitment, in the latter part of his career he has also
committed himself to a version-characteristically idiosyncratic, but a
version nonetheless-of constitutionalism. His case for
constitutionalism is set out in his powerful and subtle book, Taking the
2Constitution Away from the Courts, which I will use as the basis for this
Essay. Does this book succeed in reconciling constitutionalism with
leftism?
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. With characteristic generosity, Mark Tushnet helped me sharpen the arguments I
make here. I also received help from Lama Abu-Odeh, Randy Barnett, David Fontana, Judith
Mazo, and participants at the Quinnipiac Law School Colloquium on the work of Mark
Tushnet. I am especially grateful to James Branda and Richard Harris for outstanding
research assistance.
1. See Louis Michael Seidman, Mark Tushnet: A Personal Reminiscence, 90 GEO.
L.J.127 (2001).
2. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000).
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If there is anyone who could accomplish that task, it is Tushnet. He
is without question our most thoughtful constitutional leftist. Yet, I
argue in this Essay, the book, at least taken at face value, fails to achieve
its goal. To the extent that the book argues for constitutionalism, it
abandons leftism, and to the extent it is leftist, it abandons
constitutionalism. Tushnet's proposal can be both leftist and
constitutional only by reconceiving what constitutionalism amounts to in
ways I suggest at the conclusion of the Essay. The failure to reconcile
leftism with constitutionalism as it is more commonly understood
teaches us something important: if Tushnet cannot produce this
synthesis, then no one can.
I. TUSHNET'S THESIS
The thesis of Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts is a
good deal more subtle and complex than its pugnacious title implies.
Still, the broad outlines of Tushnet' s position are easy to summarize. He
argues for a populist constitutionalism, which would "treat[]
constitutional law not as something in the hands of lawyers and judges
but in the hands of the people themselves."3 On a populist conception,
"the Constitution belongs to us collectively, as we act together in
political dialogue . . . in the streets, in the voting booths, or in
legislatures as representatives of others."4 This populist image stands in
sharp contrast to traditional constitutionalism, which is the special
preserve of judges deliberately shielded from popular control. Hence,
Tushnet calls for an end to our two-century long experiment with the
judicial review of statutes; he calls for us to finally "take the
Constitution away from the courts."
Tushnet's proposal is subject to two obvious and interlocking
objections. First, opponents will argue that politicians cannot be trusted
to fulfill our long-term constitutional commitments, especially when
they run up against immediate political imperatives. Second, opponents
will claim that ordinary politicians lack the expertise and interest to
work through the baffling complexities of constitutional doctrine. 5
3. Id. at 182.
4. Id. at 181.
5. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in
Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 680 (2005) ("There are reasons to question whether
the executive branch is itself equipped to guide and constrain its own policy objectives by
attending, for example, to the Constitution's allocation of some powers elsewhere, or its
limitations on governmental power in recognition of individual rights.").
QLR
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
A good part of Tushnet's book is devoted to a detailed and largely
convincing refutation of these objections. The refutation begins with a
definition of the kind of constitutionalism about which we should be
concerned. There is no reason, Tushnet claims, to bind ourselves to all
the details of the "thick" constitution. 6 What matters-what constitutes
us as a nation and commands our respect-is not the deadening minutiae
of constitutional law, but the "thin" constitution, which consists of the
ideals embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution's Preamble.7
Tushnet powerfully argues that ordinary political actors have the
incentive and ability to enforce the thin constitution. On the one hand,
elected politicians no less than the courts can feel the tug of
constitutional obligation-a fact presently obscured by the "overhang"
of judicial review, which leads to dependence on courts for
constitutional enforcement. There are also built-in political incentives
favoring political enforcement of constitutional rights.8 On the other
hand, a clear-eyed review of the spotty history of judicial enforcement of
constitutional values suggests that we would be giving up very little if
we took judges out of the constitution business.9
II. THE PROBLEM THAT CONSTITUTIONALISM PURPORTS TO SOLVE
Is Tushnet's case convincing? We cannot answer that question
without asking another one: Exactly what problem is constitutionalism
supposed to solve? It turns out that there are at least two different
problems, and that people engaged in constitutional theorizing often talk
past each other because they are not talking about the same problem.
One project for constitutionalism is the creation of political
arrangements that will promote substantive justice. We might call this
substantive constitutionalism. Most of the great goals of the
Constitution's Preamble that form the center of Tushnet's thin
constitution-to "establish Justice ... promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty"'°0 -address this problem. A theorist
6. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 9 ("The thick Constitution contains a lot of detailed
provisions describing how the government is to be organized .... "). In contrast, "[w]e can
think of the thin Constitution as its fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of
expression, and liberty .. " Id. at 11.
7. Id. at9-14.
8. Id. at 95-128.
9. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 129-53.
10. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2008]
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preoccupied with this first project might ask whether a system of
separated powers best protects private property," whether requiring
congressional approval for war making helps to keep the peace,12 or
whether the nonestablishment of religion encourages vibrant religious
communities.
13
A second project for constitutionalism starts with the observation
that not everyone in our political community wants to protect private
property, avoid war, or encourage religion. This form of
constitutionalism takes as its task the creation of political arrangements
that can command respect and obedience from people who disagree
about substantive justice. We might call this project political
constitutionalism. 14 It is reflected in the Preamble's goals of "form[ing]
a more perfect Union" and "insur[ing] domestic Tranquility,"'15 which,
apparently, also play a role in Tushnet's thin constitution. A theorist
preoccupied with this second project might ask what procedures or
allocations of power would be acceptable ex ante to people with
different goals and conceptions of the good who nonetheless want to
remain within a unified community.
Each form of constitutionalism has important difficulties.
Substantive constitutionalists must confront the problem that any answer
they offer is likely to be temporally contingent. What works in some
times and places to produce substantively just results will not work in
others. Does judicial review promote or retard socially just policies?
The answer must be that it depends on who the judges are.
Because constitutionalism is associated with entrenchment,
constitutionalists often try to force us into an "all-or-nothing" answer.
11. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 503
(1988) (arguing that separation of powers raises transaction costs and thereby hinders the
passage of redistributive legislation).
12. For example, George Mason argued on the floor of the Constitutional Convention
that he was against "giving the power of war to the Executive, because not [safely] to be
trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for
clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 319 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (modification in
original).
13. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 9 (2004) (arguing that religion clauses prevent government intervention
putatively favoring religion because of risk of dependence on government).
14. This label is meant to evoke the project undertaken by John Rawls, while
simultaneously bracketing the specific means by which he pursues it. See JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
15. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFrlST?
They want us to commit to a particular arrangement because, over the
range of cases, it will produce substantively just outcomes even if, in
some times and places, alternative arrangements would do better.16 But
this formulation begs an important question: Why is constitutionalism
committed to entrenchment? Why not use particular institutional
arrangements only when, and to the extent that, they produce
substantively just outcomes?
The entrenchment question points us toward the second difficulty
with substantive constitutionalism, which, in turn, leads to
constitutionalism's political version. The problem, of course, is that we
live in a society where there is pervasive and deep disagreement about
issues of substantive justice. Without that disagreement, we could
indeed simply adjust institutions whenever the adjustment was likely to
produce the results that we all want. In the real world, where there is
disagreement, these adjustments will be resisted by the losers they
produce. The losers will rightly believe that they are playing a game
deliberately fixed to make them losers. If we are to preserve "domestic
Tranquility,"' 7 we must design rules for the game that are acceptable to
everyone, and then stick with those rules.
Political constitutionalism has well-known problems of its own.
First, it is not obvious why the initial agreement embedded in the
Constitution should command our respect. The shape of the agreement
will be determined by the entitlements the parties possess before they
come to the bargaining table. If these entitlements are unfairly
distributed at the start, then the resulting agreement will be unfair as
well.
Second, even if the initial agreement is in some sense fair, it is not
clear how we can force people to stick to the deal. If the deal is to make
any real difference, it must be enforced in cases where, but for
constitutional obligation, a group could secure its goals respecting
substantive justice. Often, people who are unwilling to respect the deal
in these circumstances are characterized as "unprincipled," but this is a
very odd use of the word. These are precisely the people unwilling to
sacrifice their deepest substantive principles for the sake of mere
political justice.
16. Tushnet explicitly adopts this view. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 141 ("[W]e
have to remember that we buy judicial review wholesale: In getting the decisions we like, we
run the risk of decisions we despise.").
17. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2008]
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The problem of enforcement is especially acute if constitutions are
entrenched over generations. The people asked to abide by the deal are
then not the people who made the deal. Moreover, the contours of the
deal itself become increasingly indeterminate as society grows further
removed from the social conditions that produced it. For example, both
sides of the modern abortion debate are able with equal good faith to
invoke the commands of the equal protection and due process clauses to
support their position on a question the authors of those commands
simply did not consider.
18
Which problem does Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
try to solve? Answering that question turns out to be quite difficult.
Much of the book is written as if the intended audience shared the
substantive goals of the left. The book argues that courts have done
much less, and political institutions much more, to advance those goals
than commonly supposed.' 9 One might think, then, that Tushnet is
arguing for a leftist version of substantive constitutionalism.
At several points in the book, however, Tushnet seems to explicitly
disclaim this reading of his thesis. In his preface, he explains that his
book provides a defense of constitutional law because populist
constitutionalism "is not in the first instance either the expression of
pure preferences by officials and voters or the expression of unfiltered
moral judgments. In short, it is not 'mere' politics, nor is it 'simply'
philosophy., 20 Later, he expresses doubt that the right question to ask is
18. Compare, e.g., John A. Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status: Justifying
Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 189, 200 (1987) (arguing that the Constitution protects a
woman's right to abort), with Martin Rhonheimer, A Constitutionalist Approach to the
Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 148 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution
protects a fetus's right to fife).
19. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 129-33, 151. Compare id. at 152 ("On balance, the
question of whether judicial review benefits progressive and liberal causes more than it harms
them seems rather difficult."), with id. at 154 ("On balance, eliminating [judicial review] is
likely to help today's liberals a bit more than it would hurt them.").
20. Id. at xi. Tushnet does not elaborate on his qualification that populist
constitutionalism is separated from pure preferences and unfiltered moral judgments only "in
the first instance." In Part IV, infra, I suggest a reading of the book that ultimately grounds its
claims on just such preferences and judgments. Similarly cryptic is Tushnet's assertion, in the
following paragraph, that he is not arguing that
populist interpretation is the only, or even the best, interpretation of the
Constitution. Rather, my argument opens up issues that thoughtful voters and
elected officials should think about, and that are obscured by the elitist
constitutional law that dominates contemporary legal thought.
TUSHNET, supra note 2, at xi. This passage is deeply puzzling. If Tushnet is really not
arguing that populist constitutionalism is the best interpretation, then why has he written a
book-long defense of it? The passage at least suggests the possibility that his embrace of
QLR
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
"whether liberals or conservatives benefit from judicial review," and
suggests that "[w]e might try to evaluate judicial review in a principled
rather than a political way.' In addition, in an important footnote,
Tushnet explains that although his "argument takes as its audience
liberal supporters of judicial review," that is "largely because they have
been [its] most prominent defenders," and that his conclusion that
judicial review "makes rather little difference, is equally applicable to
conservative defenders-or critics--of judicial review." 22
In Part III, I will assume that Tushnet favors a political constitution
and ask whether his political constitutionalism is leftist. I conclude that
it is not. Ultimately, though, for reasons that I will make clear, I do not
think that this is the best reading of the argument. Accordingly, Part IV
evaluates the substantive version of his thesis. That version purports to
be leftist, but I have some doubts as to whether it really is. Moreover, to
the extent that it is in fact leftist, I argue that it forsakes the goals of
constitutionalism. A brief conclusion, in Part V, suggests a way of
reformulating constitutionalism so as to make Tushnet's proposal both
leftist and constitutionalist.
III. TUSHNET'S POLITICAL CONSTITUTION
The main problem with a leftist version of political
constitutionalism should be obvious from what I have already written. A
leftist adherent to a political constitution must subordinate the
substantive goals of the left whenever they come into conflict with
constitutional commitments. It is important to emphasize again that
these constitutional commitments will take hold at precisely the moment
when leftist goals are within reach, because if they are not within reach,
the constitutional commitments are irrelevant. Suppose, for example,
that the political constitution prohibits redistribution of property to the
dispossessed. This prohibition will hardly matter to leftists as long as
they lack the power to effect such redistribution. At the moment they
have the power, though, political constitutionalism requires that they
forego this achievement for the sake of an agreement that purports to be
politically neutral as between left and right. What kind of a leftist would
do that?
populist constitutionalism is conditioned on its efficacy in achieving the goals of the left-a
possibility that is also explored infra in Part IV.
21. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 152.
22. ld. at 215 n.3.
2008]
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In one sense, this problem is not confined to leftist adherents to a
political constitution. Such a constitution forces people of all
substantive persuasions to subordinate their substantive views to
constitutional requirements. The problem is especially acute for the left,
though, because the left has typically not been at the table when the
agreements were formulated. Marxists and advocates of Critical Legal
Studies (who did not exist at the time), not to mention women, people of
color, and the poor (who existed in great numbers), were conspicuous by
their absence from Philadelphia in 1787.
Conservatives have it much easier. For example, libertarian scholar
Randy Barnett defends originalism and constitutional obligation even in
circumstances when this approach conflicts with the substantive goals of
libertarianism. 23 He does so, however, precisely because of his view that
the Constitution, taken as a whole, advances libertarian goals. For just
the reason that Barnett favors constitutional obligation, leftists should
oppose it, at least if Barnett is right about the Constitution's ideological
valence.
Of course, Tushnet does not defend the same political constitution
that Barnett defends. Tushnet's thin, populist constitution does not
prohibit the redistribution of property. Perhaps, then, the thin
constitution functions in the same way for leftists that the thick
constitution functions for libertarians like Barnett. But just as a leftist
should not sign on to Barnett's constitution, so too a conservative should
not sign on to Tushnet's. If in fact Tushnet's constitution tilts the
playing field toward the left, then it is substantive rather than political,
and those with different substantive views will not agree to it.
One might respond to this argument by claiming that I have ignored
just how thin the populist constitution is. Perhaps the left and right can
both agree to Tushnet's constitution because it establishes very little. At
some points, Tushnet suggests as much with respect to the abolition of
judicial review. Tushnet points out that over the course of our history,
judicial review has rarely produced results that vary much from those
that would have been produced in any event by powerful political actors:
"judicial review basically amounts to noise around zero. '24
If judicial review amounts to very little, then it follows that its
abolition would not amount to much either, and if this is true, then left
23. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 89-117 (2005).
24. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 153 ("It offers essentially random changes, sometimes
good and sometimes bad, to what the political system produces.").
QLR
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
and right can agree to the proposal. But why, then, would Tushnet
bother to write a book arguing for its abolition? Tushnet's answer is that
abolition "may contribute to serious thinking about the Constitution
outside the courts. 25  Abolition, in other words, clears the way for
populism. Whether or not substantive outcomes changed, the "people
themselves" would be involved in the task of constitutional construction.
Moreover, this populism is political rather than substantive because the
sweeping language of the Declaration and the Constitution's Preamble,
which give content to the thin Constitution, are capacious enough to
encompass the programs of both right and left.
I have some sympathy for a constitution of this sort. Indeed, I have
written a book-length defense of a version of a constitution sufficiently
26
elastic to allow all sides of political disputes to claim it as their own.
For the reasons that follow, however, Tushnet's effort to marry a thin
constitution to leftism and populism leads to a dilemma. Either the thin
constitution constrains or it does not. To the extent that it constrains, it
is not populist, and to the extent that it does not constrain, it is not leftist.
Assume first that the thin constitution meaningfully constrains
political actors. Imagine as well that judicial review has been abolished
and that the constitution has been left "in the hands of the people
themselves., 2 7 Would such a regime be populist? Oddly, Tushnet's
own argument helps demonstrate why it would not be. Tushnet takes as
one of his targets a group of legal scholars and practitioners who
formulated a set of guidelines designed to constrain what one of them
called "amendmentitis, 28 that is, the adoption of what in their view were
unnecessary, unwise, or poorly drafted constitutional amendments.29
Tushnet thinks that this effort to constrain the amendment process was
elitist because it attempted to take constitutional politics out of the hands
of the people.3°
There is something very odd about this argument. At first blush, at
least, it would seem that the authors of the guidelines were doing
25. Id. at 174 (noting that "[tihinking about a world without judicial review" may
contribute to the goal of the distribution of constitutional responsibility throughout the
population).
26. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).
27. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 182.
28. Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1995, at 20.
29. I must note here that I was the legal advisor for the group that authored these
guidelines. See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY
OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1999).
30. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 179-80.
20081
HeinOnline -- 26 QLR 565 2007-2008
]  STIT TIONALISM  I  565 
 i t    r sal. t , , l  et 
t r     r ing f r it  ti  t's r i  t t 
liti n ay i t  ri s i i   tit tion 
t i e t  tS ,,25 liti , r l ars t   r 
. ther t i  s ed, le 
selves" l   i l ed  f it ti al ti . 
r, i  lis  i  liti al r  t ti e   
i     laration  i 's l , 
i  t t t  i  stit tion,   t  
ss   f t   
 t   it ti   ,  
itt  t    i    tl  
ti    f ti l t  i   ir 26 
r  , t's   rr   t i  
 li    
   ,  
i t, t , it i  t l ti t. 
tit ti n ll  i s 
 l  
   
l es., 27  t's 
 t    
   
   
ti ,,,28  
l ?9 





. [d. ( ti t t t] i i  t  rl  it t j i i l re ie " a  
t  t  i t i  
 
.  I   
 . 
pra t 1 . 
l onstitutional end entitis, . , ll 1 , t . 
I r  I  t  l  a i   t  r  t t a t r  t s  
ee mZE F  T  ,   
F  ( . 
uS pra , 1 -  
[Vol. 26:557
precisely what Tushnet recommends. After all, they were not going to
courts and asking judges to enforce their version of constitutional
obligation. Instead, just as Tushnet urges, they were using ordinary
political processes to convince the public that the thin constitution was
inconsistent with the sorts of amendments then being considered.3'
And yet there is surely something to Tushnet's claim that advocacy
of the guidelines was in tension with populist constitutionalism. Even
though "the people" were the ultimate arbiters of whether the guidelines
should be followed, the guideline authors were insisting that failure to
follow them was in some sense illegitimate because such a failure would
be inconsistent with constitutional obligation. That insistence was anti-
populist in the sense that it denied the legitimacy of decisions that "the
people themselves" might otherwise have made.
I think that this example demonstrates that Tushnet has
misdiagnosed the problem. It is not judicial review that is inconsistent
with populism, but rather constitutionalism itself. Judicial review is one
way to enforce constitutional obligation, but unless one denies
constitutional obligation itself, the obligation would have to be enforced
in some other way in the absence of judicial review-perhaps, for
example, by elites intimidating people into believing that high principle
makes their first-order choices illegitimate.32 But to the extent that it is
enforced, whether by judicial review or by some other means, the
"people themselves" will be constrained, and the Constitution will not be
populist.
Perhaps, then, the thin constitution is not meant to constrain. On
this view, it requires no more than that people think seriously and deeply
about their political judgments, and in no way dictates their substantive
content. Such a constitution would be populist, at least in a certain
sense, but it would not be leftist. At first, this assertion may seem odd.
31. The guideline authors acknowledged that there were not formal legal constraints on
constitutional amendments, but identified themselves with the position that "even dominant
majorities should hesitate before using this power." CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 29, at 1-2. Their stated ambition for the guidelines was to "draw attention to some
aspects of the amendment process that have been ignored too frequently ... , provoke
discussion of when resort to the amending process is appropriate, and .. . suggest an approach
that ensures that all relevant concerns are fully debated." Id. at 6.
32. One might claim that this sort of argument ought not to count as enforcement so
long as the people retain the right to ignore the argument. But if this is true, why does
Tushnet think that the argument made by opponents of "amendmentitis" is anti-populist?
More to the point, if the people really are free to ignore the argument, then constitutional
obligation does not constrain, in which case, for reasons explained in the next paragraph of
text, Tushnet's constitution is not leftist.
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
From time immemorial, the rhetoric of the left has been about
empowering the people and disempowering elites. The trouble, though,
is that "the people" is an abstraction. There is not a "people" of the
United States, but different people, with different ends engaged in a
political struggle for primacy. There is no a priori reason to think that
leftists will always win that struggle. When they lose, rhetoric about the
will of the "people" is anti-leftist.
The matter is further complicated by the fact that there is no way of
measuring or discovering the "general will" without filtering it through
institutional structures that at once give it expression and distort it. We
can think of these structures as consisting of both political institutions
and extra-political distributions of power.
Consider first political institutions. Tushnet conflates the will of
the people with outcomes produced by real bodies like the House of
Representatives, the United States Senate, and state legislatures. But
why these institutions? Relying on Madisonian theory, Tushnet goes to
some length to show that members of these political bodies have
incentives compatible with constitutional enforcement.33 The trouble,
though, is that these incentives, to the extent that they in fact exist, are
creations of the thick constitution that Tushnet disparages.34  If, as
Tushnet claims, the thick constitution does not warrant our respect and
obedience, then the present shape of these institutions should be up for
grabs. It is not hard to imagine a different set of institutions-a Senate
with seats distributed proportional to population, or a federal system of
recall, referendum, and initiative, for example-that would be more
compatible with populist constitutionalism. When Tushnet asks us to
support the real institutions we presently have, he is aligning himself
with an unjust and anti-populist status quo.
The problems run still deeper. Suppose we had in place political
institutions that more accurately reflected the "popular will" as it
presently exists. It is a large mistake to suppose that this will exists
independent of a matrix of power and suppression that forms it-or, at
least, so the left has traditionally argued.
33. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 95-128.
34. The thick constitution not only establishes the incentives that Tushnet depends
upon, but also provides rules for the creation of the authoritative political acts to which he
would defer. This fact creates serious conceptual problems for his thesis. How are courts
supposed to defer to the political branches without consulting and enforcing constitutional
provisions that determine when these branches are appropriately acting in their official
capacity? See generally Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence
Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
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Historically, the argument has taken two forms. One tradition
claims that it is naive and romantic to believe that there is such a thing as
a pure expression of popular will independent of omnipresent assertions
of power. A more optimistic tradition claims that an inherently good
human nature would emerge if only the yoke of domination were
removed.
Whichever tradition one adheres to, few self-respecting leftists
would claim that political outcomes under present conditions should be
treated at face value. One need not associate oneself with all the
excesses produced by the doctrine of "false consciousness" to see that
many of these results are a reflection of, rather than a determinant of,
current economic and political arrangements. For example, the kind of
constitutional law "the people" of the United States will currently favor
is surely heavily influenced, if not entirely determined by, the current
distribution of media ownership, current levels of education, our
methods of running and financing elections, and the current distribution
of economic power. If these background conditions were changed, "the
people" might well have very different constitutional preferences.
Taking those arrangements as a given instead of problematizing them is
deeply conservative.
It is true, of course, that Tushnet's thin constitution might permit
changes in these background conditions. Importantly, however, the
changes would have to be accomplished with the background conditions
in place. And it is just these conditions that prevent the changes from
occurring. None of this is to say that change is impossible. Ultimately,
whatever the obstacles, it is always open to people to say that they have
had enough. Still, change is more likely in some circumstances than in
others. A constitutional theory that valorizes existing political
conditions and the outcomes that these conditions produce does more to
entrench the status quo than change it.
IV. TUSHNET'S SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTION
These difficulties with Tushnet's argument suggest that I may be
misreading it. Perhaps Tushnet is arguing for substantive
constitutionalism after all. It is a little hard to take at face value the
claim that the many pages of the book devoted to convincing leftists of
the virtues of his proposal are really also intended for conservative
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
eyes. 35 Moreover, the book contains several hints-albeit no more than
hints-that Tushnet's proposal is intended to further a particular version
of substantive justice.36 It is striking, for example, how tentative
Tushnet's embrace of populist constitutionalism is. At one point, he
suggests that his support for abolition of judicial review is highly
contingent. 37  At another point, he suggests that he is not really
supporting abolition at all, but rather only serious thought about the
possibility of abolition.38 These passages at least hint at the possibility
that his embrace of populist constitutionalism is contingent on it having
beneficial effects.
Other passages suggest somewhat more explicitly that he is
advocating a substantive constitution. Consider, for example, the
following statement:
The very structure of judicial review in the United States thrusts the "Who
benefits" question to the fore. More generally: Judicial review is an institution
designed to help us run a good government. It cannot be defended except by
35. It must be noted as well that Tushnet's book is one of numerous works written by
people on the left celebrating the virtues of nonjudicial constitutionalism at an historical
moment when the left has less power on the Supreme Court than it has had in generations.
See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution
from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003);
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
36. See supra notes 19 & 20.
When Tushnet writes for an audience that he knows is progressive, much of the
ambiguity falls away and he argues in a straight-forward fashion that we should abolish
judicial review because abolition is good for the left. See Mark Tushnet, Democracy Versus
Judicial Review, DISSENT, Spring 2005, at 59, available at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=248.
37. Tushnet writes:
If we accepted the controversial empirical judgments about how the political
system actually operates, and
if we thought that a stable constitutional system could be founded on such
judgments, and
if we were able to free ourselves from our obsession with courts, and
if we paid attention to the thin Constitution of the Declaration's principles,
then we would find that the idea of a self-enforcing Constitution describes an
attractive way of distributing constitutional responsibility throughout the
government.
TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 128.
38. "Populist constitutional law seeks to distribute constitutional responsibility
throughout the population. Thinking about a world without judicial review, toting up the
costs and benefits of the institution, may contribute to that goal. A modest conclusion,
perhaps, but probably the only one an academic's analysis can provide." Id. at 174.
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seeing how it operates-whether in fact the government is better with it than
without it.
Surely, it has not escaped Tushnet's attention that in a heterogeneous
society, there will be disagreement about what constitutes "good
government." As he himself acknowledges, "[t]he real question is
whether . . . in general legislatures or courts make more, and more
important, constitutional mistakes." 40 But we cannot evaluate whether a
court or legislature has made a mistake without a substantive theory.
Tushnet is therefore right in asserting that "we must have a decent theory
of constitutional interpretation outside the courts even to be able to pose
that as a question."'
4
If we take Tushnet as advancing a substantive theory, then what are
we to make of his disclaimers? I cannot be sure, but I think it possible to
read his book as a strategic intervention designed to make the best of a
very bad situation. On this reading, Tushnet as leftist confronts a
political culture extremely hostile to progressive change. Absent armed
revolt, the only hope for rearranging institutions to promote leftist causes
is to convince the conservatives presently in power that they have
nothing to fear from this rearrangement. In effect, Tushnet tells these
conservatives that they can have their cake and eat it too. They, too, can
be on the side of the people by endorsing populist constitutionalism
without actually having to give up any of their prerogatives. Populist
constitutionalism, he insists, is political rather than substantive; its
embrace does nothing to tilt the playing field one way or the other.
Of course, Tushnet, as a leftist, does not himself believe this; if he
did, he would have no reason to make the argument. He must
nonetheless make his constitutionalism appear substantively neutral to
get his substantive opponents to buy into his argument.
To be clear, I have no way to know whether this is in fact Tushnet's
strategy. Whether it is or not, though, we need to evaluate it to decide
whether his proposals can qualify as both constitutionalist and leftist.
What, then, are we to make of the strategy?
Most obviously, it puts on the table important issues about candor.
Is it right to advance an argument for populist constitutionalism in bad
faith? Writing more than twenty years ago, Paul Carrington accused
advocates of Critical Legal Studies (C.L.S.) of "train[ing] crooks" and
39. Id. at 152.
40. Id. at 57.
41. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 57.
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
teaching "the skills of corruption: bribery and intimidation. '' 2 In the
overheated atmosphere of the time, Carrington's opponents were quick
to express outrage at the charge.43 In retrospect, though, I wonder
whether they should have displayed it as a badge of honor. With
Michael Walzer 44 and Jorge Luis Borges,45 they might have suggested
that dirty hands are the mark of courage and commitment. A willingness
to sacrifice even one's own integrity for the sake of the cause is what it
means to give true primacy to leftist goals.
If this is indeed Tushnet's project, then it is authentically leftist.
Unlike the position of political constitutionalists, it does not subordinate
leftist ends to other values. The trouble, though, is that it is not a
constitutional project. Carrington's anger and panic were triggered by
C.L.S. precisely because he understood (correctly, in my judgment) that
it refused to subordinate substantive justice to rule of law values.
Obviously, this failure is inconsistent with political constitutionalism.
Indeed, Tushnet concedes as much when he says in his introduction that
in order to count as constitutional law, his proposal must not be "'mere'
politics, nor is it 'simply' philosophy. ''46 Perhaps less obviously, bad
faith arguments are also inconsistent with the brand of substantive
constitutionalism that Tushnet advocates. If the people are, indeed, to
rule, then presumably, they should be treated as capable of autonomous
choice. In other words, they should be accorded the respect that bad
faith manipulation denies them.
Of course, saying that the strategy is in tension with
constitutionalism is not to say that it is wrong. Perhaps we should be
leftists rather than constitutionalists. But if one is really going to get
one's hands dirty, then at least one should have something to show for
the effort. On the level of strategy, I am very doubtful that populist
constitutionalism is in fact the best means to advance us toward the goals
of the left.
We have already explored one problem with the strategy. Under
present conditions, it is far from obvious that "the people themselves"-
42. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984).
43. See Peter W. Martin, Of Law and the River, and of Nihilism and Academic
Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 1 (1985) (collecting correspondence in response to
Carrington's article).
44. See Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 160 (1973).
45. See JORGE LUIS BORGES, Three Versions of Judas, in LABYRINTHS: SELECTED
STORIES AND OTHER WRITINGS 95 (Donald A. Yates & James E. Irby eds., 1962).
46. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at xi.
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or, more precisely, political institutions that may or may not represent
"the people themselves"-will favor the programs of the left. Tushnet
responds to this problem by pointing out that we need to make
comparative judgments. He couples this response with a deflationary
account of the history of judicial review. Together with many other
scholars,47 he is rightly skeptical of the claim that courts have often or
successfully defended the disempowered. Leftist advocates of judicial
review make the mistake of imagining a court populated by the justices
they would choose. But there has not been, and will not be, such a court.
Rather than waste resources on trying to produce the deus ex machina of
a leftist court, Tushnet urges progressives to do the hard work of
building political support for their programs.
Tushnet is right to insist that we need to make comparative
judgments, but I think that the comparison actually cuts the other way.
Yes, it is hard to imagine the sudden emergence of a leftist court, but it
is even harder to imagine that Tushnet's proposal to take the
Constitution away from the courts will be put in place.48 In making this
comparison, we must start by acknowledging that any strategy designed
to create progressive change is a long shot. Still, I think that Tushnet
underestimates both the difficulty in securing the adoption of his
program and the potential for judicial review.
Consider first the possibility that current political institutions might
actually take the Constitution away from the courts. How likely is it that
this will come about any time soon? Tushnet imagines the Justices
abandoning their own power,49 but everything that we know about
human nature and political actors makes this highly unlikely. Are the
other branches likely to take the power from them? For reasons that are
admittedly difficult to understand, the Supreme Court remains the most
47. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
48. Tushnet himself provides reasons why "[finding the political support for [proposals
to abolish judicial review] is .... likely to be quite difficult." TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 172.
As he points out, effectuating his proposal would require a talented political leader, who might
not emerge. Moreover, people see themselves as potential beneficiaries of Supreme Court
rulings, and this hope may blind them to the possibility of losses in the Supreme Court. And
even if judicial review harms a given political group on balance, at a particular moment, it
may be helping some members of that group, and these members will see proposals for
abolition as a threat. Id.
49. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 154.
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
popular governmental institution in the country.50 In the teeth of the
current Court's incompetence, venality, and pomposity, Americans
continue to prefer judges to legislators and presidents.
If I have correctly identified Tushnet's strategy, he imagines that
somehow the people who presently hold power can be tricked into
relinquishing it by the claim that populist constitutionalism is politically
neutral. Even if they are so convinced, however, that accomplishment at
best eliminates one strand of conservative opposition. It does nothing to
change America's baseline infatuation with courts.5 Moreover, it is
always a mistake to imagine that our opponents are stupid. For reasons
outlined above, I have doubts that populist constitutionalism tilts
leftward, but assuming arguendo that it does, conservatives are just as
able to perceive the tilt as are progressives. Why, then, would they agree
to it?
Oddly, in this regard, Tushnet makes the same mistake that he
accuses his opponents of making. Like his opponents, he starts by
imagining a political alignment where his proposal would be plausible.
But if there were such an alignment, the proposal would not be
necessary in the first place.
Progressives make this same mistake when they propose procedural
changes like campaign finance reform. It may be true that if only we
had fair financing of elections, it would be possible to enact progressive
legislation. But the same forces that block the progressive legislation
also block meaningful campaign finance reform. Occasionally, a
coalition can be formed that creates procedural reform when it would be
impossible to assemble a coalition that backs the substantive changes
made possible by the procedural reform. More often, though, people
understand that procedures have substantive consequences, and those
people are unwilling to agree to procedural changes that are likely to
produce substantive outcomes they oppose. Given this fact, and as
50. Although confidence in the Supreme Court has been declining along with
confidence in all institutions of government, the Court remains far ahead of Congress and the
Presidency. Polling data reported in June, 2007 indicated 34% of Americans voicing a "great
deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Supreme Court, as compared to 25% voicing similar
views of the Presidency, and 14% voicing similar views of Congress. See Frank Newport,
Americans' Confidence in Congress at All-Time Low; Confidence in Most Institutions Drops,
GALLUP, June 21, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/27946/Americans-Confidence-Congress-
AllTime-Low.aspx.
51. Even Larry Kramer, a strong defender of popular constitutionalism, concedes that
"[p]ublic acceptance of judicial supremacy pervades constitutional law and politics."
KRAMER, supra note 35, at 233. Accordingly, "trying to build opposition to the Court by
decrying judicial supremacy will not go down well with most Americans." Id. at 232.
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difficult as the fight may be, it makes sense for progressives to use their
scarce resources to change people's minds about their substantive
programs rather than to fight procedural battles, whether they be over
campaign finance or the power of judges.
For these reasons, I think that the prospects of taking the
constitution away from the courts are less encouraging than Tushnet
imagines. What about the complementary prospect of putting in place a
leftist Court? This too is an uphill fight to say the least. Tushnet is right
to claim that the history of judicial review offers little in the way of
encouragement. But although the prospects are surely bleak, there are
reasons to think that the odds of seeing a leftist Court are better than the
odds of Tushnet's strategy succeeding.
The main reason for optimism is that the Supreme Court is
populated by only nine people who are appointed for life. True, the
chance of an authentic leftist surviving the appointment and
confirmation process is close to zero, but people change over time,
especially when political pressures are removed. It is worth pondering
the fact that perhaps the most radical, independent, and iconoclastic
justice in the Court's history-William 0. Douglas-began his judicial
career as a politically cautious jurist without a well-defined
jurisprudential philosophy.52 No other justice has moved as far left as
Douglas, but there are many other examples-Harry Blackmun, John
Paul Stevens, and David Souter come to mind-of justices who have
ended up being more progressive than they were thought to be at the
time of their confirmation. Is it really impossible that five people might
undergo such a transformation at the same time?
Even if the Court turned strongly left, it is not at all clear that it
could actually put in place a leftist program. As many others have
pointed out, the Court's power is sharply constrained and its very few
efforts to effect meaningful social change have had, at best, mixed
results.53 Once again, though, we have to ask the "compared to what"
52. During his early years on the bench, Douglas was preoccupied with positioning
himself to become President. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND
LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 203-21 (2003). He "showed little interest in developing a
long-term jurisprudential philosophy," and decided issues raised in cases based on "his own
best interests" and "his political future." Id. at 201-02.
53. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 47; Klarman, supra note 47. Cf Jane S.
Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54 Drake L. Rev. 861, 863
(2006) ("[Although] any romanticized picture of judges as countermajoritarian
revolutionaries, single-handedly making public policy more progressive, is empirically
unsustainable .... The notion that the institutional properties of courts disable them from ever
driving social change in a significant way has its own caricatured qualities.").
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CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
question. It is not just the Court, but progressive politicians as well, who
have failed to prevent the slide into oligarchy and imperialism. Judges
have at their disposal the myth of constitutional obligation that
politicians lack. A judge so inclined might make substantial good use of
a rhetoric and mystique that continues to have a hold on the American
people.
It is doubtless the case that the self-conscious choices of politicians
or judges produce little social reform. It is most often the unintended
consequences of large scale social forces-of wars, migrations, and
changes in material conditions.54 Romanticizing either judicial review
or political mobilization is surely a mistake. My claim, then, is very
modest: if we are to choose between politicians and judges, there is no
good reason to count judges out, especially in a world where judicial
review is already in place and where it will take a great deal of effort to
dislodge it.
V. OUR UTOPIAN CONSTITUTION
Tushnet's failed effort at a leftist constitutionalism puts the
question to us: if we must choose between constitutionalism and leftism,
what choice should we make? As much as I hate to confirm the clichr, I
must say that as I grow older, I become more ambivalent about the right
answer. I have a friend who refers to herself as a "retired Marxist." I
know what she means. Being a real leftist is a full time job.55 It requires
courage, commitment, sacrifice, and an endless appetite for lost causes.
54. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 174 (2004) ("World War I's
contribution to progressive racial change cannot be overstated. Earlier wars had had similarly
egalitarian consequences.").
55. Cf. IRVING HOWE, STEADY WORK (1966). The epigraph to Howe's book wryly
evokes the quixotic patience that is necessary for left utopianism--a patience that, if we are
not very careful, shades into passivity and irrelevance:
Once in Chelm, the mythical village of the East European Jews, a man was
appointed to sit at the village gate and wait for the coming of the Messiah. He
complained to the village elders that his pay was too low. "You are right," they
said to him, "the pay is low. But consider: the work is steady."
Id. at iv. For Howe himself, however, "steady work" meant something quite different. As his
friend and colleague, Michael Walzer, wrote upon Howe's death:
I often asked myself: why did a man of such high talent, so cultured, so
insightful, who used the English language with such power, devote himself for
forty years, day in, day out to ... political/diplomatic/editorial drudgery? Why the
endless phone calls?... Why the constant fund raising, which he was never good at
and certainly never enjoyed? Why the stream of notes and postcards, suggesting
2008]
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Perhaps more to the point, being a leftist means always being a pain
in the ass. A political constitution provides a way for people to get
along with each other. It is a template for political pluralism that allows
for the possibility of companionship and common ground among people
who might otherwise be at each other's throats. These are large virtues,
especially given the fact that foregoing them would barely increase the
dismal chances for large-scale social change in any event.
There are days-many of them-when I am drawn to these virtues.
And yet I cannot quite shake my commitment to the left. I think of my
own leftism (on the days, that is, when I think of myself as a leftist at all)
as consisting of a more or less involuntary temperamental disposition
rather than allegiance to any real program. Being a leftist in this sense is
being temperamentally drawn to permanent critique. It is never having a
home, always being dissatisfied, always haunted by the knowledge that
the wrong people have power and that things are not as they should be.
This sort of leftist temperament leads to a paradox, which, in turn,
might explain why Tushnet's constitutionalism is leftist after all. A
frequent charge leveled against leftists of this sort is that they lack a
positive program.56 The paradox is that a positive program is actually
necessary to sustain permanent critique-albeit the program must be one
that can never be achieved. Leftist utopianism provides an important
motivation for critique. To imagine a goal that might actually be
achieved is to give up the permanence of the criticism. To concede that
one has no goal at all is to slide into cynicism. The only alternative is to
adhere to a goal that is forever out of reach, all the while claiming-to
oneself and to others-that, if only we hang together and are strong, we
can reach it after all.
projects, reminding us of deadlines, hammered out one after another, every day,
while the essays he wanted to write and the books he wanted to read lay
waiting? ...
The answer is the man, a man of the left and a socialist, who knew that this
work, exactly this work, was what we were here for, that we did not have to finish
it but could not give it up, that someone had to pay attention even to the smallest
matters-and if someone, then us, then him.
Michael Walzer, Irving Howe: 1920-1993, DISSENT, Summer 1993, at 275, 276. Although
Walzer was describing Howe's years of service as editor of Dissent, he might well have been
speaking of Tushnet's years of service as secretary to the Conference of Legal Studies, not to
mention his work in thankless jobs like Associate Dean of the Georgetown University Law
Center and President of the Association of American Law Schools. Both men understood that
revolutions require selflessness as well as ego, organization as well as spontaneity, attention to
detail as well as to vision.
56. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 42, at 227.
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CAN CONST1TUTIONALISM BE LEFTIST?
Perhaps this leftist utopian vision provides the best way to
understand Tushnet's constitutionalism. I have been treating it as a
serious proposal, which is, of course, how Tushnet treats it, and how
utopians must always treat their own proposals. But perhaps this is a
misunderstanding of what the proposal is all about. Returning the
Constitution to the people is not something that actually will be-that
we would actually want to be-achieved. It is, instead, a platform on
which we can stand so as to see over the heads of those now in power to
an imagined world where the corruption, evil, and obfuscation that are
the hallmarks of modern, mainstream constitutionalism no longer exist.
Seeing the deficiencies in our current situation-seeing them
clearly and unsparingly-is surely leftist. Imagining a different world
might also be taken to be constitutionalist, not in the ordinary sense of
the word, but in the sense that religious millenarianism is constitutional.
People can be constituted by such imaginings. One can organize a mode
of living around a commitment to critique and to the hypothetical world
that grounds the critique.
Such a commitment can provide rules of conduct and a basis for
cooperation with others who share the same vision. That is certainly not
the sort of constitutionalism that mainstream theorists talk about, but it is
not nothing either; and it is, perhaps, all that we can expect of a
constitutionalism that is authentically leftist.
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